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THE ULTRA SOUND-OFF: THE ULTRASOUND
MANDATE DEBATE AND A LITIGATOR'S GUIDE
TO OVERCOMING OBSTACLES TO A WOMAN'S
RIGHT TO ABORTION

I. INTRODUCTION
Since Roe v. Wade1 first legalized abortion on a nationwide level in
1973, many states have passed or attempted to pass laws limiting a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy.2 Currently, many states require that
an abortion be performed by a licensed physician, some states require that
women seeking abortions undergo counseling or endure waiting periods,
and some states require parental consent for minor patients.3 Most recently, some states have passed or attempted to pass laws requiring a woman
seeking an abortion to undergo an ultrasound and be required, or at the very
least be offered an opportunity, to view the image. 4 These laws have been

1 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2

See id. at 164 (granting women right to terminate pregnancy "prior to approximately the

end of the first trimester"); see also, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2012) (banning partial birth abortions
on federal level); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 132 (2007) (challenging Partial-Birth Abortion Act of 2003); Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 969-70 (1997) (responding to Montana
law restricting performance of abortions to licensed physicians); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992) (challenging Pennsylvania law requiring
informed consent, parental consent, and spousal consent prior to obtaining abortion).
3 See State Policies in Brief: An Overview of Abortion Laws, GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE (Feb.
1, 2014), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib OAL.pdf (detailing pre-abortion requirements by state).
4 See State Policies in Brief: Requirementsfor Ultrasound,GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE (Feb. 1,
2014), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib RFU.pdf (providing ten states total require ultrasound prior to abortion as of February of 2014). Three states require that the provider
display and describe the image, and two other states have similar laws that are temporarily unenforceable or permanently enjoined. ld.; see also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.2 (2008) (requiring physician to perform ultrasound prior to abortion and show and describe image to woman); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.85 (2013) (held unconstitutional by Stuart v. Loomis, No. 1:11-CV804, 2014 WL 186310 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 17, 2014)); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-738.3d (West
2004) (enforcement permanently enjoined); TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012
(West 2010) (requiring physician to perform ultrasound prior to abortion and show and describe
image to woman); Wis. STAT. § 253.10 (2013) (same). Seven states require a physician to perform an abortion and offer the woman an opportunity to view the image, though viewing it is not
mandatory. See ALA. CODE § 26-23A-4 (2009) (requiring performance of ultrasound but not requiring woman to view); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2301.02 (2009) (same); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
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the source of intense legal and political controversy, and while some judges
have upheld such laws, others have blocked their enforcement, leading to
inconsistencies in the ways courts are handling and interpreting these laws
in light of current abortion jurisprudence.5
Ultrasound mandates tend to be part of informed consent provisions, and proponents of the provisions argue that requiring a woman to
undergo an ultrasound prior to obtaining an abortion allows her to be fully
informed about the procedure and all of the potential consequences. 6 These
laws have been attacked by women's rights advocates, medical professionals, and legal scholars, who argue that they are unnecessary, that they infringe upon the constitutional rights of women, and that they confer too
many rights to the unborn fetus . This note will explore some of the largest
obstacles a litigator will likely face when trying a case for a client suing a
state for violating her rights and the arguments a litigator would need to
make in order to increase the likelihood of a favorable outcome.8
This note will begin with a brief snapshot of the current state of the
law, followed by an overview of the historical evolution of abortion jurisprudence. 9 The historical overview will include an explanation of the history and purpose of informed consent, an overview of fetal rights in the
United States and the history and evolution of the fetal rights argument, as

390.0111 (West 2007) (same); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-34-2-1.1 (West 2007) (same); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 65-6709 (West 2002) (same); MIss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-34 (West 2007) (same); VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-76 (2009) (same).
5 See Texas Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 579-80 (5th
Cir. 2012) (upholding mandatory ultrasound requirement in Texas). But see Nova Health Sys. v.
Edmondson, 233 P.3d 380, 382 (Okla. 2010) (enjoining Oklahoma ultrasound requirement).
6 See Daniel Avila, The Right to Choose, Neutrality, and Abortion Consent in Massachusetts,
38 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 511, 533 (2005) ("The most conscientious decisions at this point in pregnancy can be made only if a woman or girl can free her imagination to ponder what it may mean
to have a child. There is much to be gained morally from helping pregnant women to learn to
think this way."); see also sources cited infra note 37 (providing examples of ultrasound mandates as informed consent provisions).
7 See Carol Sanger, Seeing and Believing: Mandatory Ultrasound and the Path to a Protected Choice, 56 UCLA L. REV. 351, 360 (2008) (arguing mandatory ultrasounds are intrusive, manipulative, and unnecessary); Nadia N. Sawicki, The Abortion Informed Consent Debate: More
Light, Less Heat, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 16-18 (2011) (highlighting critics' position
that ultrasound informed consent provisions reflect "offensive and antiquated views about women"); Ian Vandewalker, Abortion and Informed Consent: How Biased Counseling Laws Mandate
Violations of Medical Ethics, 19 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 3 (2012) (calling abortion informed
consent provisions "biased").
8 See infra Part IV. (explaining potential obstacles and discussing possible arguments to
make against each obstacle).
9 See infra Part II. (providing overview of current state of law); infra Part III. (providing historical background of abortion jurisprudence).
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well a brief history of women's rights with respect to abortion. 0 The analysis section of this note will attempt to present the many obstacles a litigator may face when suing a state on behalf of a woman's right to an unburdened abortion.11 This note will attempt to frame arguments for a litigator
to make to ensure the greatest probability of overcoming obstacles and prevailing against the State.12 Finally, this note will conclude with a prediction of the likelihood of a favorable outcome on each potential argument.13

II. FACTS
Though Roe v. Wade made abortion legal in all states, many states
currently have restrictions in place with respect to the abortion process.14
For example, as of February 2014, seventeen states require women to receive counseling prior to obtaining an abortion, twenty-six states require
that women seeking an abortion must wait for a period of time between receiving counseling and obtaining an abortion, and thirty-nine states require
parental involvement in a minor's decision to have an abortion. 15 Most recently, states have begun passing laws requiring women seeking abortions
to undergo an ultrasound and be offered an opportunity to view the image. 16 Proponents of such laws argue that they are predominantly intended
to fully inform the woman of the very permanent and irreversable decision
she is about to make. 17 Opponents, however, argue that such laws generally appear in conservative, pro-life states and are geared at making abortion
as inaccessible and difficult as possible.18
10
I
12
13
14

See infra Part III. (providing historical background of abortion laws in United States).
See infra Part IV. (discussing potential obstacles one may face when trying such cases).
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V. (predicting outcome of arguments).
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973) (declaring abortion legal in all states subject to

certain limitations); see also State Policies in Brief: An Overview of Abortion Laws, supra note 3
(outlining examples of some abortion restrictions by state as of February 2014); State Policies in
Brief: Requirementsfor Ultrasound,supra note 4 (providing overview of ultrasound requirements
by state as of February 2014).
15 See State Policies in Brief: An Overview of Abortion Laws, supra note 3 (detailing general
pre-abortion requirements by state as of February 2014).
16 See State Policies in Brief: Requirements for Ultrasound, supra note 4 (providing overview of ultrasound mandates by state as of February 2014).
17 See Avila, supra note 6, at 556 (discussing opinion that scientifically accurate information
helps women make more informed decision). The idea is that, since this is a serious medical procedure with irreversible consequences, the woman should be provided with as much information
as possible so she is able to make a knowing and intelligent decision about whether or not to go
through with the abortion. See id.
18 See Sahil Kapur, Indiana Republicans Advance Transvaginal Ultrasound Bill, TPM DC
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Typically a woman has the option of choosing whether to receive
the ultrasound via an transabdominal (external) transducer or via a transvaginal (internal) transducer, but some states, such as Virginia, have worded the statutory language in such a way that the provider is required to use
whichever method will produce the clearest picture.1 9 Since most abortions
occur at a very early stage in the pregnancy, when the fetus is still very
small, a transvaginal transducer is often necessary in order to obtain a clear
picture, thus rendering the woman's choice to the contrary effectively
moot. 20

III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A.

Evolution of Abortion Laws

Abortion was widely accepted as a legitimate medical procedure in
the United States until the 1800s when states began passing laws criminalizing abortion. 21 The rationale for criminalizing abortion varied from state
to state, but for the most part, the motivation for the desire to outlaw abortion was related to medical safety, or was even, as some speculate, related
to racist and socioeconomic fears-considerably different from the often
moral and religious rationale that tends to be behind anti-abortion laws today.22

(Feb. 22, 2013), http://tpmdc.talkingpointsmemo.com/2013/02/indiana-republicans-advancetransvaginal-ultrasound-bill.php (arguing purpose of ultrasound mandates is only to make abortion more difficult).
19 See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-76(B) (2009) (providing example of state statute requiring offer of other ultrasound imaging if transabdominal is unclear); see also OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63,
§ 1-738.3d(B)(1) (West 2004) (allowing choice between transabdominal or transvaginal, but requiring physician to use whichever produces clearest picture).
20 See supra note 19 and accompanying text (noting transvaginal ultrasound often required
when transabdominal will not produce clear picture); see also Jeremy Byellin, Is Virginia's New
Pre-Abortion Ultrasound Requirement Constitutional?, THOMSON REUTERS LEGAL SOLUTIONS
BLOG (Mar. 9, 2012), http://westlawinsider.com/top-legal-news/is-virginias-new-pre-abortionultrasound-requirement-constitutional/ (commenting though women appear to have choice, often
transvaginal ultrasound is only real option).
21 See
History
of
Abortion,
NATIONAL
ABORTION
FEDERATION,
http://www.prochoice.org/about-abortion/history abortion.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2014)
(providing overview of history of abortion law in United States); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 130-41 (1973) (reviewing history of abortion law). In Roe, the court reasoned that since
abortion was not criminal during the formation of the Constitution, women who wished to abort
in 1973 faced more obstacles than would have been intended by the framers of the Constitution.
Roe, 410 U.S. at 140-41.
22 See History of Abortion, supra note 21 (commenting on various motivations for outlawing
abortions in the 1800s). Some states introduced laws criminalizing abortion because of fears that
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Laws restricting abortion continued throughout the twentieth centu-

ry until the Supreme Court decided Griswold v. Connecticut23 in 1965.24 In
Griswold, the Court held that the Constitution provided for a "zone of privacy," which prevented the government from intruding on the marital relationship in order to ban the use of contraceptives.25 This decision created
precedent which "opened the door for a revival of fundamental rights and
substantive due process review" with respect to privacy and reproductive
rights. 26 The ruling in Griswold was significant, but the Court was clear
that the decision was narrowly tailored to the marital relationship.2 The
Court's later decision in Eisenstadt v. Baird28 significantly expanded the
Griswold rule by reasoning that the "zone of privacy" existed outside of the
marital relationship as well. 29 This expansion of the right of privacy paved

the immigrant population would overtake the Anglo-Saxon population with a much lower birth
rate. Id. Abortions also, like most medical procedures in the 1800s, were very risky and dangerous, and this may have been a factor in the decision to outlaw abortions in some states as well.
Id. Abortion was not generally thought of as immoral at this time, and the morality argument was
probably not a factor in the earliest attempts to criminalize abortions in the 1800s. Id. Religious
and moral arguments did not surface until much later. ld. In fact, some have pointed out that
Christianity, which is often now behind many of the arguments against abortion today, originally
did not teach that abortion was immoral; the Biblical interpretation that the fetus was a person or
a potential life seems to be a relatively new idea. See Jonathan Dudley, How Evangelicals Decided That Life
Begins
at Conception,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Nov. 5,
2012),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jonathan-dudley/how-evangelicals-decided-that-life-begins-atconception b 2072716.html [hereinafter Dudley I] (noting up until 1968 popular Christian opinion was life began at birth rather than conception). In a similar article, Dudley also comments
that the opinion that abortion was immoral was not made widespread until the 1970s and 1980s in
part by a televangelist by the name of Jerry Falwell, and his dissemination of such an opinion was
largely the reason for its widespread popularity among evangelical Christians and Catholics during that time period. See Jonathan Dudley, My Take: When EvangelicalsWere Pro-Choice,CNN
BELIEF BLOG
(Oct. 30, 2012), http://religion.blogs.cnn.com/2012/10/30/my-take-whenevangelicals-were-pro-choice/ [hereinafter Dudley II] (noting reasons for widespread change in
Christian religious beliefs regarding abortion in 1970s and 1980s).
23 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
24 ld. at 484-86.
25 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485 (holding marital relationship falls "within the zone of privacy
created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees").
26 See Robert M. Godzeno, Note, The Role of UltrasoundImaging in Informed Consent Legislation Post-Gonzales v. Carhart, 27 QUINNIPIAC L. REv. 285, 288 (2009) (opining on significance of Griswold as precedent for later fundamental rights decisions despite narrow focus).
27 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86 (holding only marital relationship included in this zone
of privacy).
28 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
29 Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453-55 (holding zone of privacy extends outside of marital relationship). Specifically, the Court said:
[T]he marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but
an association of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional
makeup. If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, mar-
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the way for the Court's 1973 decision in Roe v. Wade, which invalidated all
state laws criminalizing abortions in the first trimester of a pregnancy.' ° In
Roe, the Court also explained the fine line between the rights of the woman
and the rights of the fetus and the balancing act that was required to fairly
protect the rights of each. 31 In the years following Roe, many states attempted to curtail abortion rights by imposing various requirements, limitations, and restrictions on the abortion process, and in Planned Parenthood
v. Casey,12 the Supreme Court ultimately established that states may regulate the abortion process, but may not impose an "undue burden" on the
right of a woman to obtain an abortion.33 This "undue burden" standard
was upheld and further refined in subsequent Supreme Court decisions 3and
4
remains the standard by which abortion restrictions are measured today.
The most recent challenge to abortion rights are laws that require a
woman to obtain an ultrasound and be offered an opportunity (or sometimes even required) to view the image.3 5 These laws are criticized by
tied or single, to be free from unwarrantedgovernmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.
Id. at 453 (emphasis added).
30 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (declaring right to abortion prior to fetal viability
is fundamental right grounded in Fourteenth Amendment).

In Roe, the court applied the expan-

sion of the right to privacy from previous decisions and said that the right to privacy was "broad

enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." Id.
31 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 150-51 (noting duality of interests between life of mother and life of
fetus). The Court attempted to strike a balance between these interests by saying that a woman
has the right to terminate her pregnancy, but that the right is not absolute. ld. Once the fetus
reaches viability (the point at which the fetus is capable of surviving outside of the womb), the
state has a legitimate interest in protecting the life of the fetus and can bar abortion at this point.
ld. Prior to the point of viability, the Court held that the woman's interest controls, and she has
the right to terminate her pregnancy until the fetus is viable. Id.
32 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
33 See id. at 876-77 (establishing "undue burden" standard). The Court held that in order to
simultaneously protect the right established by Roe and the state's interest in the unborn fetus, a
state may regulate abortion procedures. Id. However, state regulations cannot have the "purpose
or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus." ld. The Court in Casey further went on to clarify that supplying information to a
woman does not constitute an undue burden, even if that information is targeted at discouraging
the woman from going through with the abortion. Id.
34 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 147 (2007) (holding Partial-Birth Abortion
Ban Act of 2003 not undue burden because includes maternal health exception); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 931-32 (2000) (holding Nebraska partial-birth abortion ban constitutes undue
burden because does not include maternal health exception); Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S.
968, 975 (1997) (restricting performance of abortions to physicians does not constitute undue
burden).
35 See supra note 4 and accompanying text (providing ultrasound requirements by state).
Three states require that provider display and describe the image, while seven require that the
provider perform the ultrasound and simply offer the woman an opportunity to view the image,
though she is not required to actually view it. State Policies in Brief: Requirementsfor Ultra-
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women's rights proponents and legal scholars, but whether 3they
constitute
6
answered.
be
to
remains
that
question
a
is
burden"
an "undue
B. The History of the Doctrine of Informed Consent

Ultrasound mandates are typically included as part of informed
consent provisions of regulatory statutes; therefore it is relevant to this discussion to develop the history and purpose of the doctrine of informed consent. 3
In medical law, the initial purpose of the doctrine of informed consent was to protect patients from unwanted medical intrusions or batteries,
thus, ultimately protecting the patient's bodily integrity.38 Informed consent has evolved over time and is now merged with the concept of negligence with regard to medical malpractice-a physician's failure to inform a
patient of the risks associated with a particular procedure constitutes negligence.39 Courts have recognized that the doctrine of informed consent is
not to be applied rigidly and that doctors may sometimes use discretion in
determining how to discuss the risks with the patient in order tosometimes necessarily-protect the patient's emotional and mental wellbeing. 40

The idea is still to protect the patient's bodily integrity-the

sound, supra note 4.
36 See Sawicki, supra note 7, at 16-18 (highlighting some critiques of ultrasound informed
consent provisions); see also Byellin, supra note 20 (noting "undue burden" standard yet to be
applied to ultrasound mandates).
37 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-23A-4 (2009) ("[C]onsent to an abortion is voluntary and informed if and only if ... [p]rior to the performance of an abortion, the physician who is to perform the abortion or his or her agent shall receive the signed receipt of the certified mail dated 24
hours before the abortion, if mailed, and the signed forms that she has ...had the opportunity to
view the video and the ultrasound of her unborn child .. ");
MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-34 (West
2007) (determining patient has consented only if patient has been provided opportunity to view
ultrasound image); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-738.3d (West 2004) ("In order for the woman
to make an informed decision ...the physician who is to perform or induce the abortion ...shall
...[p]erform an obstetric ultrasound on the pregnant woman, using either a vaginal transducer or
an abdominal transducer, whichever would display the embryo or fetus more clearly ...").
38 See Schloendorff v. Soc'y of New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) ("Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his
own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient's consent commits an
assault ....); see also Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 7 (Cal. 1972) ("Where a doctor obtains consent of the patient to perform one type of treatment and subsequently performs a substantially
different treatment for which consent was not obtained, there is a clear case of battery."); Mohr v.
Williams, 104 N.W. 12, 15-16 (Minn. 1905) (holding consent to operation on right ear did not
constitute consent to surgery on left).
39 See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 796 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (holding failure to disclose
risks constitutes negligence); Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1108-09 (Kan. 1960) (holding
failure to disclose risks of radiation to patient constitutes negligence).
40 See Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 317 P.2d 170, 181 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
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choice belongs to the patient, and the patient cannot make a real choice unless he or she is provided with full and accurate information about a given
procedure. 41 Thus, the fundamental theory underlying the doctrine of informed consent is that the patient has a protected interest in making an autonomous decision, and fully informing the patient of the risks associated
with medical procedures allows the patient to make a knowing and fully
autonomous choice.42 Other legal scholars point out that the right to be
free from unwanted medical intrusions is part of the constitutional right to
privacy, and that the right to be free from unwanted medical intrusions is
also a basic human right.43
Including ultrasound mandates in informed consent provisions creates significant debate among the legal community.4 4 Proponents of the ultrasound mandates argue that providing women with an opportunity to see
an image of the fetus she is about to abort allows the woman to fully understand the decision she is about to make and allows her decision to be fully
informed, autonomous, and free. 45 However, opponents of the mandates
argue that rather than "informed consent," forcing a woman to view an ultrasound image prior to obtaining an abortion is simply "harassment masquerading as knowledge" and that forcing doctors to convey a particular
message to patients also violates doctors' First Amendment rights in a way
that typical informed consent provisions do not. 46 In fact, forcing a woman
1957) (rejecting rigidity in rules of disclosure for purposes of informed consent); see also Maya
Manian, The IrrationalWoman: Informed Consent and Abortion Decision-Making, 16 DUKE J.
GENDER L. & POL'Y 223, 236 n.83 (2009) (noting rigidity in informed consent with respect to
abortion in stark contrast to Salgo interpretation).
41 See Vandewalker, supra note 7, at 5 (stating that under doctrine of informed consent
"the
decision belongs to the patient").
42 See Vandewalker, supra note 7, at 5 (quoting Arato v. Avedon, 858 P.2d 598, 605 (Cal.
1993)).
43 See Manian, supra note 40, at 262-63 (noting right to be free from unwanted medical in-

trusions included in constitutional right to privacy); see also International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, available at
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/b3ccpr.htm (noting it is human right for individuals not to
be subjected to unwanted medical treatment).
44 See infra note 46 and accompanying text (discussing opposition to ultrasound as informed
consent). But see infra note 45 and accompanying text (discussing proponents' position that ultrasound should rightfully be included in informed consent provisions).
45 See Avila, supra note 6, at 533 (explaining that helping women to think of fetus as potential life leads to better decision).
46 See Sanger, supra note 7, at 360 (arguing mandated ultrasound is not truly informed consent but rather harassment). Sanger writes that "[m]andatory ultrasound disrupts the law's traditional respect for privacy, bodily integrity, and decisional autonomy in matters of such intimacy
as reproduction, pregnancy, and family formation." ld.; see also Robert M. Godenzo, Note, The
Role of Ultrasound Imaging in Informed Consent Legislation Post-Gonzales v. Carhart, 27
QUINNIPIAC L. REv. 285, 323 (2009) (arguing abortion disclosure laws "not really informed consent"). Godenzo further argues that if the true goal of an ultrasound mandate is to inform the pa-
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to undergo an ultrasound (an invasive medical procedure itself) in order to
obtain an abortion does seem to directly conflict with the original purpose
of informed consent-to protect patients from unwanted medical intrusions.4
C. Fetal Personhood

Ultrasound mandates, and abortions generally, also raise questions
about fetal personhood (i.e., whether or not a fetus is a full human life with
rights that should be protected). 48 "Pro-life" measures, or measures aimed
at making a woman change her mind about having an abortion in order to
preserve the life of the fetus, tend to be aimed at acknowledging the fetus
as a "person," or at the very least, a potential life. 49 The concept of considering a fetus a person is an idea that often stems from religious beliefs, but
this idea is thought to be relatively new and thus unlikely to have been part
of what the framers of the Constitution considered when they drafted the
Constitution and contemplated protecting human rights.50
tient, an ultrasound image is not necessary to achieve this end. Godenzo, supra. Alternatively,
doctors have other options such as describing the process to the woman, showing an artist's rendering of a fetus, or other informative options that are less invasive and less emotionally charged
than a forced ultrasound. ld. Forcing a doctor to convey "the state's content-based message to
their patients, a message they do not want to deliver" absent patient consent does not protect patients' interests and violates doctors' First Amendment rights. See Stuart v. Loomis, No. 1:11CV-804, 2014 WL 186310, at *1 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 17, 2014); see also Manian, supra note 40, at
242-54 (arguing informed consent to abortion is treated differently from consent to other medical
procedures). "Adults make important emotional medical decisions that may lead to regret in
many situations ... but the law does not interfere with those decisions on the ground that someone other than the patient knows better what life choices will lead to mentally healthy consequences." Manian, supra note 40, at 242-54. Abortion mandates undermine patient autonomy in
ways that other informed consent provisions do not, and violate the rights of both the patient and
the doctor. See id.; Stuart, 2014 WL 186310, at *1.
47 See Sarah E. Weber, Comment, An Attempt to Legislate Morality: Forced Ultrasounds
as
the Newest Tactic in Anti-Abortion Legislation, 45 TULSA L. REv. 359, 372 (2009) (calling forced
ultrasounds violation of right to refuse medical care); see also Vandewalker, supra note 7, at 8-9
(indicating choice should belong to patient with regard to medical procedures); supra notes 38-42
and accompanying text (discussing original purpose of informed consent laws as protection of
bodily autonomy). But see Mailee Smith, Pre-Abortion Ultrasounds Serve Essential Purpose,
JURIST (Mar. 16, 2012), http://jurist.org/hotline/2012/03/mailee-smith-abortion-ultrasound.php
(arguing ultrasound part of normal medical procedure for abortion in many clinics). Smith says
that ultrasounds serve an necessary medical purpose-to diagnose and predict risks and ultimately protect the health of the mother. ld. Smith also argues that ultrasounds prior to abortion are
necessary to accurately determine the gestational age of the fetus, which is a vital fact to know
prior to performing an abortion since abortions after a certain gestational age are not legal. ld.
48 See infra notes 63-64 and accompanying text (discussing opposing positions in fetal personhood debate).
49 See infra notes 63-64.
50 See Dudley II, supra note 22 (commenting on idea that life begins at conception not wide-
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The state of the law is somewhat conflicted on the issue of whether
fetuses are considered legal persons.5 1 With respect to abortion, Roe recognized the tension between the rights of the mother and the rights of the
fetus. 52 That tension continues to create conflict today, as "pro-choice advocates claim that the mother's rights must prevail over those of the fetus,
while pro-life activists argue that the rights of' 53the fetus are at least equal to,
if not predominant over, those of the mother."
While the abortion debate highlights the controversy over whether
a fetus is (or should be) a person, the law itself recognizes some instances
in which fetuses have rights and others in which they have few or none. 54
Traditional common law originally required that the fetus be born alive in
order for harm to the fetus to be considered criminal or tortious.55 This
common law requirement seems consistent with the fact that abortion was
also legal prior to the 1800S. 56 As more rights are conferred upon unborn
fetuses in modern law, the requirement that the fetus be born alive has
largely been discarded. 57 For example, this transition into conferring more
rights to fetuses over time is illustrated in wrongful death statutes; while
wrongful death statutes formerly prohibited recovery for the death of a fetus, some states now allow survivors to recover for the wrongful death of

spread until 1970s and 1980s).
51 See infra notes 53-55, 58-60 and accompanying text (noting conflicts in law with regard to
whether fetuses should have rights of legal persons).
52 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 150-51 (1973) (discussing duality of rights at issue in
abortion cases); see also supra note 31 and accompanying text (discussing balancing act between
women's rights and state's rights to protect fetal interest).
53 Bram Alden, Comment, Unborn & Unprotected: The Rights of the Fetus Under § 1983, 57
UCLA L. REV. 481, 494 (2009) (explaining pro-life and pro-choice positions with respect to
abortion).
54 See City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 458 (1982)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting Roe decision on "collision course with itself'); Roger J. Magnuson & Joshua M. Lederman, Family Law: Aristotle, Abortion, and Fetal Rights, 33 WM.
MITCHELL L. REv. 767, 769 (2007) ("When it comes to the personhood of the unborn, the law of
logic is today sorely challenged by the collision course of fetal rights laws and abortion laws.
These two areas of law seem to run on parallel tracks without any connecting principles."); see
also Murphy S. Klasing, The Death of an Unborn Child: Jurisprudential Inconsistencies in
Wrongful Death, Criminal Homicide, and Abortion Cases, 22 PEPP. L. REv. 933, 933 (1995)
(pointing out inconsistencies in laws with respect to fetal homicide). "It makes no sense for
courts to say an 'abortion' of an unborn child is legal, but the 'wrongful death' of the same child
by someone other than the mother is not legal." Klasing, supra.
55 See Commonwealth v. Cass, 467 N.E.2d 1324, 1325 (Mass. 1984) (discussing traditional
born-alive rule).
56 See History of Abortion, supra note 21 (discussing trend of criminalizing abortion beginning in 1800s).
57 See infra notes 58-60 and accompanying text (discussing instances where fetus in utero
has rights).
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an unborn child. 58 There are other instances as well which demonstrate a
trend towards increasing fetal rights despite the fact that non-viable fetuses

seem to have very few rights with respect to abortion-for instance many
states now recognize fetal homicide as a crime but still allow abortion. 9
One judge has even placed an unborn child in the protective custody of the
state; however, the decision was later overruled on appeal. 60 Thus, there
seems to be some confusion as to whether a fetus is considered a legal person with all of the protectable human rights that such status implies, and
laws which confer rights to a fetus certainly seem to be at odds with the
fact that abortion is legal in every state.61
While pro-life proponents argue that personhood status should be
conferred upon the fetus, opponents argue that there are significant consequences that may arise from giving fetuses legal personhood status. 6'
Women's rights advocates tend to strongly oppose such measures because
conferring full personhood status upon a fetus would inevitably detract
from the rights of the mother. 6' Though courts do not currently require a
person to compromise their own bodily integrity for the benefit of another,
as society continues the trend of increasing fetal rights, it may begin to create a slippery slope, leading to complicated-and arguably harmful-legal,
58 See Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northhampton, 138 Mass. 14, 17 (1884) (prohibiting wrongful death recovery for death of fetus), overruled by Torigian v. Watertown News Co., 225 N.E.2d
926, 927 (Mass. 1967).
59 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-1 (2007) (establishing fetus is person for purpose of homicide); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1102-1105 (2010) (same); CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West
2008) (establishing killing of fetus is murder); see also 10 U.S.C. § 919a (2012) (recognizing fetus as person on federal level if killed or injured during certain violent crimes). But see Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973) (decriminalizing abortion in first trimester in all states).
60 See Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Collier, 95 S.W.3d 772, 781-82 (Ark. 2003) (granting
certiorari to vacate lower court decision to place fetus in protective custody of state). Citing the
Arkansas Juvenile Code, the lower court "declared an unborn fetus to be dependent-neglected and
placed the fetus in DHS's custody." ld. at 773-74 (describing lower court's finding that fetus was
protected by Arkansas Juvenile Code). The Colliercourt ruled that the term "juvenile" could not
be expanded to include a fetus and that in order to place a child in protective custody, the child
would first have to be born. See id. at 781-82.
61 See Magnuson & Lederman, supra note 54, at 769 (opining fetal rights laws conflict with
right to abortion).
62 See infra notes 63-64 and accompanying text (highlighting divide over fetal personhood
debate).
63 See Dawn E.Johnsen, Note, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women's ConstitutionalRights to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L. J. 599, 600 (1986) (arguing
fetal rights unconstitutionally burden constitutional rights of women); Nora Christie Sandstad,
Pregnant Women and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Feminist Examination of the Trend to Eliminate Women's Rights During Pregnancy, 26 LAW & INEQ. 171, 173 (2003) (arguing increasing
fetal rights infringes upon women's rights). But see Juliana Vines Crist, Note, The Myth of Fetal
Personhood, 60 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 851, 854 (2010) (arguing "when a state confers 'personhood' to an unborn human, it does not sound the death knell for reproductive rights.").
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scientific, and social consequences. 64
Whether ultrasound mandates actually constitute personhood
measures is also debated.65 Seeing the image of the fetus in an ultrasound
image may indeed persuade the mother that the fetus is actually a person or
at the very least, a potential human life.66 In fact, many say that the ultimate purpose of an ultrasound mandate is to convince the mother that the
fetus is a person (or potential person) and convince her to change her mind
about going through with the abortion. 67 However, a mandated ultrasound
may simply be considered information provided to the mother so that she

64 See In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1243-44 (D.C. 1990) ("[C]ourts do not compel one person
to permit a significant intrusion upon his or her bodily integrity for the benefit of another person's
health."); see also Joseph Boven, Anti-Choice "Egg-as-Person"Initiatives Threaten the Rights of
Women,
RH
REALITY
CHECK
(Nov.
12,
2009,
8:53
AM),
http://www.rhrealitycheck.org/blog/2009/11/12/antichoice-eggasperson-initiatives-threatenrights-of-women (pointing out social and scientific consequences of fetal personhood). Boven
suggests that if we deem a fetus a legal person, that status could be effective even if the woman
did not know she was pregnant. See Boven, supra. Therefore, acts such as drinking while pregnant could be criminally punishable, even if the woman was not yet aware of the fact that she was
pregnant. Id.; see also Ed Goldman, The Conflict Between Fetal PersonhoodLaws and Women's
Rights, JURIST (Nov. 17, 2011), http://jurist.org/forum/2011/11/ed-goldman-personhood-laws.php
(discussing fetal personhood and consequences in medical care, stem cell research, contraception,
and other topics). If fetuses are granted legal personhood, parents may be entitled tax deductions
for unborn children, in vitro fertilization (IVF) may be rendered illegal since unneeded embryos
would not be allowed to be discarded, stem cell research would be entirely outlawed, and some
birth control methods (i.e., the morning-after pill) may become illegal. See Goldman, supra.
Goldman also comments that women would essentially be "transport and delivery systems" with
very limited rights during a pregnancy. Id. Additionally, women who miscarry or have stillborn
children could potentially be prosecuted for murder. Id.
65 See infra notes 66-67 and accompanying text (explaining examples of various positions
regarding whether ultrasound mandates constitute personhood measures).
66

See LISA M. MITCHELL, BABY'S FIRST PICTURE: ULTRASOUND AND THE POLITICS OF

FETAL SUBJECTS 6 (University of Toronto Press Inc., 1st ed. 2001) ("For some parents, the ability
to see the fetal parts.. .may demonstrate that the fetus...has the potential for or actually possesses
distinctive human consciousness and personhood."); Khiara M. Bridges, Capturingthe Judiciary:
Carhartand the Undue Burden Standard, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 915, 972-73 (2010) (opining
ultrasound is picture and morally significant persons get their picture taken); June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Families, Fundamentalism, & The First Amendment: Embryo Fundamentalism, 18
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1015, 1024 (2010) (suggesting ultrasounds "personalize" the embryo);
Justin Murray, Exposing the UndergroundEstablishment Clause in the Supreme Court'sAbortion
Cases, 23 REGENT U. L. REV. 1, 61 (2011) (commenting ultrasounds may play role in forming
judgments about personhood); Kate Sheppard, Virginia Is For Zygote Personhood?, MOTHER
JONES (Feb. 14, 2012, 3:47 PM), http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2012/02/virginia-zygotepersonhood (labeling Virginia's ultrasound law as personhood measure).
67 See Kapur, supra note 18 (opining purpose of ultrasound mandate is to change mother's
mind or make abortion more difficult); see also Avila, supra note 6, at 533 (explaining idea that
ultrasound mandates are geared at making woman consider fetus as person). If a woman considers the fetus a person or potential life, she may be more likely to change her mind and decide
against going through with the abortion. See Avila, supra note 6, at 533.
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can make a fully informed decision about the pending abortion procedure.68
Critics of fetal personhood measures also point out that the judiciary should not answer the question of when life begins (and therefore
should not decide whether a fetus or embryo constitutes a person), and that
indeed the Court has had the opportunity to answer the question of personhood and has explicitly declined to answer this question.69 Consequently,
whether a fetus should be considered a person is in a current state of conflict, and the question of whether forced ultrasounds as legal precursors to
abortions constitute personhood measures also currently remains unresolved .

IV. ANALYSIS
A. Mandated Ultrasounds Constitute HarassmentRather Than
Informed Consent
In order to succeed in having an abortion mandate invalidated, a
litigator will need to make the argument that, although the ultrasound laws
were created under the guise of "informed consent" provisions, they are really just unnecessary harassment "masquerading" as informed consent. 1
The original purpose of informed consent was to protect patients from unwanted medical intrusions and to allow a patient to make informed, auton-

68 See supra Part II.B. (discussing ultrasound mandates as part of informed consent provisions and purpose of consent provisions generally).
69 See Jed Rubenfeld, On the Legal Status of the Propositionthat "Life Begins at Conception," 43 STAN. L. REv. 599, 606 (1991) (observing Court has declined to determine personhood
status of fetuses); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159-60 (1973) (refusing to answer "most
sensitive and difficult question" of when life begins).
70 See Magnuson & Lederman, supra note 54, at 769 (arguing fetal rights conflict with logic

of Roe decision); see also, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 919a (2012) (recognizing fetus as person on federal
level for purposes of homicide laws); ALA. CODE § 13A-6-1 (2007) (establishing fetus as person
for purpose of homicide laws); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1102-1105 (2010) (same); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 187 (West 2008) (same); Torigan v. Watertown News Co., 225 N.E.2d 926, 926
(Mass. 1967) (allowing wrongful death recovery for death of fetus). But see Roe, 410 U.S. at 164
(decriminalizing abortion in all states).
71 See supra note 37 and accompanying text (indicating ultrasound mandates typically included in informed consent provisions). But see Sanger, supra note 7, at 360 (arguing mandated
ultrasound is not truly informed consent but rather harassment). Sanger comments that mandatory ultrasounds invade the privacy of women in a way that contradicts the original intended purpose of informed consent laws. ld.; see also Stuart v. Loomis, No. 1:11-CV-804, 2014 WL
186310, at *15-16 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 17, 2014) (finding state's ultrasound requirement also violates
doctors' free speech, unlike ordinary informed consent requirements).
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omous decisions about what happens with her own body. 2 However, forcing an additional medical procedure on a woman before she can undergo an
abortion is directly contrary to this idea.
Proponents of the laws argue
that the ultrasound image allows the woman to make an informed choice
about ending the pregnancy by giving her an opportunity to fully understand and contemplate the very permanent decision she is about to make,
and reason that seeing the image of the fetus makes it less likely that she
will abort. This antiquated logic assumes that women are not capable fully considering the consequences of their actions and reasons that showing a
woman a picture of the fetus will open her eyes to the reality that she is
terminating the potential for human life. Furthermore, an abortion is already an extremely difficult decision for most women to make, and forcing
them to undergo an ultrasound and view an image of, and/or hear a description of the developmental status of the fetus is an unnecessarily emotionally
traumatic experience. 6 Ultrasound mandates are directly contrary to the
original purpose of the doctrine of informed consent: to allow the patient to
make a knowing, informed decision about the medical procedure and avoid
unwanted medical intrusions.
Furthermore, while rigidity in the application of informed consent
provisions has previously been rejected, application of ultrasound mandates
affords little flexibility.7S While some ultrasound mandate laws do permit

72

See supra note 38 and accompanying text (noting original purpose of informed consent

was to protect patients' bodily integrity); see also Vandewalker, supra note 7, at 31-32 (commenting purpose of informed consent is to ensure decision belongs to patient). Vandewalker also
comments that the physician and patient together should be able to make the choice about what
information the patient will receive. See Vandewalker, supra note 7, at 31.
73 See supra note 46 and accompanying text (noting forced ultrasounds contrary to purpose
of informed consent); Weber, supra note 47, at 372 (arguing mandatory ultrasounds violate patient's right to refuse medical care); see also Stuart, 2014 WL 186310, at *15-16 (holding mandatory ultrasound violates doctors' rights).
74 See Sanger, supra note 7, at 351 (noting purpose of ultrasound mandates is to make abortion less likely); see also Avila, supra note 6, at 533 (explaining ultrasound image intended to
help women make better decision regarding abortion).
75 See Sawicki, supra note 7, at 17 (arguing mandatory ultrasounds reflect "offensive and
antiquated views about women").
76 See Godenzo, supra note 46, at 321-23 (arguing ultrasound imaging unnecessary and detailing possible less invasive alternatives).
77 See Vandewalker, supra note 7, at 31-32 (arguing ultrasound mandates contrary to original
purpose of informed consent); Weber, supra note 47, at 372 (commenting forced ultrasounds contrary to right to refuse medical care); see also Manian, supra note 40, at 254-55 (noting abortion
is treated differently from other medical procedures in terms of informed consent). But see
Smith, supra note 47 (opining ultrasounds medically necessary and thus not contrary to purpose
of informed consent).
78 See Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 317 P.2d 170, 181 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1957) (holding doctors should have discretion with respect to medical disclosure); Manian, supra
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the woman to avert her eyes from the image, the doctor is absolutely required to perform the ultrasound, even if he or she believes that performing
the ultrasound would cause unnecessary emotional distress for the patient.
This lack of discretion is directly at odds with previous authority rejecting
rigidity with respect to medical disclosure requirements. 8 o
B.

Undue Burden Argument

Whether ultrasound requirements constitute an undue burden likely
presents the largest hurdle because this has yet to be decided.8 1 Furthermore, the relevant precedent seems to lean towards ultrasound requirements not being considered an undue burden.8 2 The Court, when establishing the "undue burden" standard in Casey, held that supplying information
to a woman prior to obtaining an abortion does not constitute an undue
burden, even if the purpose of supplying that information is aimed at dissuading the woman from going through with the procedure.83 Thus, the
state would likely argue that ultrasound mandates simply provide additional
information to the woman, and as such do not constitute an "undue burden"
under the Casey standard.8 4 Unlike the provisions in Casey that were

note 40, at 256 (noting ultrasound mandates are rigidly applied in contrast to Salgo decision); see
also sources cited supra note 4 (citing specific statutes containing little room for physician discretion as to whether to perform ultrasound).
79 See State Policies in Brief: Requirementsfor Ultrasound, supra note 4 (noting doctor is
required to perform ultrasound though woman can avert her eyes from image).
so See Salgo, 317 P.2d at 181 (allowing physicians to exercise discretion over rules of medical disclosure); Manian, supra note 40, at 236 n.83 (noting ultrasound mandates allow no room
for discretion as provided by Salgo); Weber, supra note 47, at 366-68 (arguing ultrasound mandates directly contrary to purpose of informed consent); see also Vandewalker, supra note 7, at 5
(explaining purpose of informed consent is to ensure patients retain autonomy in medical care
decisions).
81 See supra note 36 and accompanying text (noting courts have yet to decide whether ultrasound mandates constitute undue burden).
82 See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 147 (2007) (holding Partial Birth Abortion Ban
Act of 2003 constitutional due to maternal health exception); Steenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914,
931-32 (2000) (holding failure to include maternal health exception does constitute undue burden); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 838 (1992)
(holding providing information to woman prior to abortion does not constitute undue burden);
Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 768, 975-76 (1991) (requiring abortions to be performed by
physician is not undue burden).
83 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 838 (holding supplying information prior to abortion is not undue
burden, even if information is biased). Following the reasoning in Casey, although information
gleaned from an ultrasound may in fact be biased in favor of a pro-life agenda, it likely will not
constitute an "undue burden" for that reason alone; a more significant "burden" would need to be
demonstrated. See id.
84 See id. Additionally, many of the laws have been titled "Right to Know Acts," indicating
that the drafters intended for them to at least be perceived as information-providing provisions.
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struck down, the ultrasound mandates do not actually inhibit or prevent the
woman from seeking an abortion. 5 Furthermore, states like Virginia,
which have included exceptions for rape, incest, and cases where the mother's health is at risk, have positioned themselves to easily overcome an obvious "undue burden" challenge. 6 Though this argument likely presents
the biggest hurdle to a case against a state's ultrasound mandate, the litigator will nevertheless want to argue that ultrasound mandates do in fact constitute an undue burden.81 Despite this significant challenge, failing to
convince the court that ultrasound mandates constitute an "undue burden"
will not necessarily sound the death knell for the litigator's entire case, as
there are other important constitutional and policy arguments to consider. 88
C.

Ultrasound Mandates Constitute Unconstitutional Infringement of
Privacy.

One of the strongest arguments against ultrasound mandates is the
argument that they constitute an unconstitutional infringement of privacy
contrary to the Court's reasoning in Roe and its progeny.8 9 The Court's decisions in Griswald and Eisenstadt set the stage for the it's decision in Roe
by creating a "zone of privacy" into which the government cannot extend

See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.85 (2013) (labeling ultrasound mandate as "Women's Right to
Know Act" (overruled by Stuart v. Loomis, No. 1:11-CV-804, 2014 WL 186310, at *20
(M.D.N.C. Jan. 17, 2014)); ALA. CODE § 26-23A-4 (2009) (same).
85 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 838-41 (defining what constitutes undue burden within challenged
statute); see also, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-23A-4 (2009) (requiring ultrasound but not inhibiting
abortion); MIss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-34 (West 2007) (same); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-76 (2009)
(same).
86 See ALA. CODE § 26-23A-4 (2009) (providing exception for medical emergency); IND.
CODE 16-34-2-1.1 (West 2007) (providing medical emergency exception); VA. CODE ANN. §
18.2-76 (2009) (providing exception for rape or incest and maternal health exception); see also
Byellin, supra note 20 (opining ultrasound laws with exceptions have positioned themselves to
defeat "undue burden" challenge). But see Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-34 (West 2007) (appearing
to provide no medical emergency exception).
87 See Byellin, supra note 20 (commenting "undue burden" argument difficult to make
against mandates positioned similarly to Virginia's law).
88 See supra Part IV.A. (discussing informed consent arguments against ultrasound mandates); see also infra notes 89-92 and accompanying text (analyzing constitutionally-grounded
privacy arguments against ultrasound mandates); supra note 64 and accompanying text (discussing potential consequences of conferring personhood status to fetuses).
89 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (extending zone of privacy to decision of
whether to terminate pregnancy); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454-55 (1972) ("[I]t is the
right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.");
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (holding marital relationship should be
free from privacy invasion).
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its reach. 90 The language in Eisenstadt is particularly useful here, as the
Court in its decision specifically asserted, "If the right of privacy means
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarrantedgovernmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child."91 Thus, one
could argue that the ultrasound mandates constitute an unwarranted government intrusion (a literal intrusion in the case of transvaginal ultrasound)
and infringe upon the right to privacy, granted by Roe and its progeny, in a
way that other informed consent provisions do not. 92 The physical medical
invasion imposed on the woman during a mandated ultrasound goes beyond provisions that have previously been upheld in the past, and as such
constitute an infringement on the woman's right to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusions. % This of course would require asking the
court to expand the right to privacy slightly, but since the "zone of privacy"
has already been established and the Court has already said that it encompasses the decision of whether or not to terminate a pregnancy, the likelihood of the Court expanding
upon this right of privacy in this way is not
94
far-fetched.
entirely
D. UltrasoundMandates Constitute PersonhoodMeasures And
Confer Too Many Rights To The Fetus At The Expense Of The
Mother
Although the issue of whether ultrasound mandates constitute a fetal personhood measure is contested, there is a strong argument that they

90

See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 454-55 (extending zone of privacy to non-marital relation-

ships); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86 (creating zone of privacy for marital relationship); see also
Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 ("This right of privacy.., is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.").
91 See Eisenstadt,405 U.S. at 453-54 (emphasis added).
92 See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 838 (1992)
(holding informed consent not necessarily undue burden); Roe, 410 U.S. at 164 (holding decision
to terminate pregnancy is part of zone of privacy).
93 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 838 (upholding informed consent provision of challenged statute);
see also Godenzo, supra note 46, at 323 (arguing ultrasound mandate not necessary to adequately
inform patient); Manian, supra note 40, at 242-52 (observing abortion informed consent treated
differently from other informed consent); Sanger, supra note 46 at 360 (opining mandatory ultrasounds more invasive than other kinds of informed consent).
94 See supra notes 25-31 and accompanying text (discussing historical expansion of zone of
privacy). Since the Court has previously found that the "zone of privacy" extends to decisions
individuals make regarding how to construct their families, it is not unreasonable to argue that a
forced ultrasound is an unwarranted governmental intrusion (quite a literal intrusion in the context of transvaginal ultrasounds) into an individual's right to freely decide how to construct her
own family. See supra notes 25-31.
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are in fact personhood measures aimed at granting more rights to an unborn
child and inevitably detracting from the rights of the mother. 95 The motivations behind such laws are decidedly "pro-life:" the rationale is that seeing the image of the fetus will cause the woman to consider the potential
96
life within her and reconsider her decision to terminate her pregnancy.
Additionally, the ultrasound image itself gives the fetus significance; for
many potential parents the first time they see the ultrasound image is the
defining moment of the pregnancy-the moment when the fetus becomes a
significant human being. 97 While some argue that the ultrasound is aimed
at simply providing as much information to the woman as possible, it is difficult to deny that these laws contain elements of fetal personhood, especially given the undeniable "pro-life" motivations behind most of the
laws. 9'

Even if the litigator can convince the court that ultrasound mandates do in fact constitute fetal personhood measures, he or she still faces
the uphill battle of convincing the court not to increase fetal rights. 99 Given
the inconsistencies in the law with respect to whether fetuses are considered legal persons, it is difficult to predict what precedent the Court would
use to decide this matter.1 00 The current trend appears to lean towards in-

95 See MITCHELL, supra note 66, at 6 (arguing seeing ultrasound image may convince women

fetus has human qualities); see also Bridges, supra note 66, at 972-73 (arguing morally significant persons get picture taken); Murray, supra note 66, at 61 (opining ultrasound may convince
some to make judgments regarding personhood of fetus). If morally significant persons only get
their picture taken, then an ultrasound is thus an attempt to personalize the fetus. See Bridges,
supra note 66, at 972-73; see also Carbone & Cahn, supra note 66, at 1024 (arguing ultrasounds
constitute personhood measures). But see supra Part III.B. (discussing mandates as informed
consent provisions rather than personhood measures).
96 See Avila, supra note 6, at 556 (concluding purpose of ultrasound mandate is to help
women make "better" decisions regarding abortion); Sanger, supra note 7, at 351 (noting purpose
of ultrasound mandates is to make women less likely to proceed with abortion); see also Alden,
supra note 53, at 484-85 (explaining pro-life position regarding abortion).
97 See MITCHELL, supra note 66, at 6 (noting ultrasounds may persuade people that fetus is
human life); Bridges, supra note 66, at 972-73 (opining only morally significant people get their
picture taken); Carbone & Cahn, supra note 66, at 1024 (suggesting ultrasounds "personalize"
fetus); Murray, supra note 66, at 61 (commenting ultrasounds may help people to form judgment
about fetal personhood).
98 See Alden, supra note 53, at 484-85 (discussing pro-life position with respect to abortion
laws).
99 See Magnuson & Lederman, supra note 54, at 769 (noting increased fetal rights at odds
with abortion jurisprudence); see also Boven, supra note 64 (discussing potential social, criminal,
and scientific consequences of increasing fetal rights); Goldman, supra note 64 (discussing medical and other consequences to increased fetal rights); Johnsen, supra note 63, at 600 (opining increased fetal rights burdens constitutional rights of women); Sandstad, supra note 63, at 173 (arguing increasing fetal rights is to detriment of women's rights); sources cited supra note 59 and
accompanying text (discussing states increasingly recognizing fetal homicide as crime).
100 See supra Part III.C. (introducing inconsistencies in law as to whether fetuses considered
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creasing fetal rights, despite the fact that abortion is still legal in all
states. 10 1 However, increasing fetal rights and moving towards a society
which embraces fetal personhood potentially has many complicated consequences.102 Though it could hardly be said that upholding ultrasound mandates would confer full legal personhood status to the fetus, one would
could argue that ultrasound mandates create an unprecedented slippery
slope, opening the door to further personhood measures and leading society
down a road towards embracing full fetal personhood.103
The Court's reasoning in Roe recognizes the need to delicately
counterbalance the interests of the unborn child (and the right of the state to
protect that interest) with the rights and interests of the mother.'°4 Therefore one would want to argue that opening the door to granting legal personhood status to fetuses not only has complicated consequences, but additionally flies in the face of the reasoning in Roe, whereby the Court
deliberately attempted to strike a delicate balance between protecting the
interests of the unborn child without infringing too heavily upon the rights
of the mother. 10 5 Furthermore, conferring full personhood the fetus at the
expense of the mother would create a society where women are essentially
required to forgo their own bodily integrity for the benefit of another human being, which is something the court has explicitly refused to do in the
past. 106 But given the current trend of increasing fetal legal rights, it may
be difficult to convince the court that a line should be drawn here, by striking down ultrasound mandates as potential personhood measures, when fetal rights are being expanded in many other areas of the law. 107 If the court
is to remain consistent with the long-standing reasoning of Roe, a line will
have to be drawn somewhere in order to prevent the tipping of the scales in
favor of the fetus at the expense of the mother, and a litigator will need to
convince the court that the line ought to be drawn here, by striking down
ultrasound mandates. 0 8 To continue the trend of increasing fetal rights by

persons).
101 See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text (discussing trend of increased fetal rights
in various areas of law).
102 See supra note 64 and accompanying text (outlining possible consequences of increasing
fetal rights).
103 See supra note 64 (noting potential consequences and complications).
104 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-54 (1973) (discussing need to balance interests of
the woman with state's interest in protecting potential life).
105

See id.

106 See In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1243-44 (D.C. 1990) (holding courts will not compel individual to compromise own bodily integrity for benefit of another).
107 See supra Part III.C. (discussing evolution of fetal rights in various areas of law).
108 See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 919a (2012) (recognizing fetal homicide as crime on federal level);
ALA. CODE § 13A-6-1 (2007) (establishing fetus is person for purpose of homicide); ARIz. REV.
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upholding ultrasound mandates upsets the delicate balance between fetal
rights and women's rights by tipping the scale too far in favor of fetal
rights, and is therefore contrary to the long-standing reasoning in Roe
which advocates for a delicate balancing of these two interests. 109
In addition, even though the Court has had opportunities to answer
questions relating to fetal personhood and when life begins, it has explicitly
declined to do so.110 Since the Court seeming has asserted that issues relating to fetal personhood are not something the judiciary should decide, a litigator would want to argue that legislation in favor of such likely ought to
be avoided as well.111 Increasing fetal rights inevitably implies that life begins at conception, thus resolving a question that courts seem to have intentionally left open for individuals to decide.1 1 2 Therefore a litigator would
want to argue that in declining to answer this question, the Court ultimately
reasoned that this is a decision that should be made by individuals, rather
than by the judiciary or legislature.1 13

V. CONCLUSION
Likely the greatest challenge in the battle against ultrasound mandates will be convincing the court that such mandates constitute an "undue
burden" to a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy. Given the existing
precedent and the fact that many states have poised their statutes to easily
overcome an obvious undue burden challenge, it seems as though it would
be difficult to convince the court that requiring a woman to receive an ultrasound prior to obtaining an abortion does in fact constitute an undue
burden. However, even if the litigator loses on this argument, he or she
could still prevail, given the other compelling constitutional and policy arguments to be made in favor of women's rights. Particularly compelling
are the arguments that ultrasound mandates constitute a violation of privacy
that not only defeat the very purpose of informed consent-to protect bodi-

§§ 13-1102-1105 (2010) (same); CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West 2008) (same);
Torigan v. Watertown News Co., 225 N.E.2d 926, 927 (Mass. 1967) (allowing wrongful death
recovery for fetus).
109 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153-54 (explaining delicate balance between interests of mother and
STAT. ANN.

state's interest in protecting unborn fetus).
110 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 159-60 (declining to answer "th[e] most sensitive and difficult question" of when life begins).
III See id.; see also Rubenfeld, supra note 69, at 606 (noting Court has declined opportunity
to answer personhood question).
112 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 159-60 (leaving open question of when life begins).
113 See id.

2013-2014]

ULTRASOUND REQUIREMENT

175

ly autonomy and privacy-but also constitute a constitutional infringement
upon the "zones of privacy" previously defined by the Court. Furthermore,
while increasing fetal rights is acceptable and necessary in some areas of
the law, a line must be drawn somewhere in order to avoid the complicated
consequences discussed earlier in this note. Therefore, despite the fact that
the "undue burden" argument is likely to fail (particularly against states
with statutes carefully constructed to overcome such a challenge), the remaining arguments against ultrasound mandates are so convincing that
there is still a strong chance that a litigator would be able to successfully
convince the court that the mandates ought not to be upheld.
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